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MAIN STAGES AND FACTS IN THE HISTORY OF STATE-CHURCH
RELATIONS IN BULGARIA

By Nonka Bogomilova
Nonka Bogomilova, DSci, Professor at the Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge
of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Research interests: Philosophy and Sociology of
Religion, Religions in Europe and in the Balkans, Religion and Politics. Principal
monographs: Religion and Human Essence. Classical Ideas (2010), Religious Diversity in the
Contemporary European Culture (Debates, Phenomenology, Cultural-Anthropological
Dimensions) (2010); Religion, Law and Politics in the Balkans in the End of 20th and the
Beginning of 21st Century (2005); Religion: Spirit and Institution (1999).

State-Church relations in Bulgaria are multidimensional phenomena, bearing changes and
dynamic transformations in the course of historical processes. The purpose of this paper is to
map out the main stages and developments of church-state relations from Bulgaria’s acceptance
of Christianity to the present.
Christianization and the First Bulgarian State (681 – 1018). For two centuries after its
establishment in 681 A.D., the Bulgarian state retained the traditional pagan beliefs of the
population. In the 9th century, after several years of diplomatic activity and hesitation between
Roman and Byzantine alternatives, the Bulgarian Tzar Boris adopted Christianity from
Constantinople and converted his people. On March 4, 870 the Constantinopolitan Council
established this new local Church, the Bulgarian Archbishopric, under the supreme canonical
jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The conversion to Christianity was decided for
political reasons and had a civilizing purpose: 1) The adoption of a single religion aimed to
provide a unifying ideology for the ethnically and religiously diverse population of the Bulgarian
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state (comprising Slavs and proto-Bulgarians); 2) Christianity would integrate the young state
into the civilized world, turning it from a “barbarian” realm into a partner-state open to cultural
assimilation by the Christian world. The Slavonic-Bulgarian language was introduced as the
official language of state and Church in 893. This period, known to historians as the First
Bulgarian State, ended with the loss of Bulgarian independence to Byzantine domination in
1018.
The historical process of conversion to Christianity of the young Slavic states (9th to 10th
centuries) was both a complex process of acculturation of their political and intellectual stratum
and a natural process of further fragmentation and “nationalization” of Christianity itself. This
was a process of acculturation, transfer of ideas, functions, and institutions bearing universal
contents and asserting cultural claims in a new environment of essentially mixed ethnicity and
religion. The adoption of Christianity gradually replaced tribal identity and self-consciousness
based on kinship ties and substituted in its place an association of different tribes and ethnic
groups in a universal cultural product–the institution of the state. Byzantine Christianity (the
specific spirit and sacral motivation of which was embedded in Byzantine political theory and
institutional practice) was also a universalistic-integrating factor for the states that adopted it,
serving as integration with respect to a unifying spiritual and political center.
From a political perspective, for the newly converted states, the adoption of Christianity
provided: 1) a transcendent, universal spiritual foundation for political power, and specifically
for the power of the head of state; 2) the permanent division of the religious and state spheres
under separate persons (the tsar or prince, and the patriarch) and institutions (the political state
hierarchy and the ecclesiastic hierarchy); 3) the correlation of these trends and processes with,
and their mediation by, an external ideological and institutional center–Byzantium.
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The newly converted Slavic states became part of the Byzantine oekumene, or the
Byzantine commonwealth as Dmitrii Obolensky called it; these states were treated by analogy to
the children of the powerful Pater familias.1 “Byzantinism,” as the famous Bulgarian historian
Petar Mutafchiev interpreted it, proved to be a combined product of Byzantine imperial interests
and the rivalling ambitions of Bulgarian rulers, who wanted to take over the Empire and were
hence forced to adopt and translate to their native soil the same political and religious
instruments that ensured the imperial domination of Byzantium. Of course, these instruments
were foreign to the “lifestyle and experiences of their own nation.”2
Petar Mutafchiev was all too critical of the imperial ambitions of Bulgarian statesmen,
more critical even than Arnold Toynbee, Dimitrii Obolensky, as many other authors,3 had an
ambivalent attitude to these ambitions. He believed they had brought about periods of cultural
and military growth, but they were also characterized by him as representing the “illusions” and
“misunderstandings” that, relying on nothing but the force of “their own people, believed they
could assume the universal and political mission of the cosmos that was Byzantium.”4 The
Bulgarian rulers thereby exhausted the forces of the people for a long time to come. He
interpreted the social function of Bogomilism in this perspective, seeing it as a response against a
foreign culture and influence, against a religion and a sophisticated theology that gave no
answers to the questions that really concerned the mass of the people; according to Mutafchiev,
this movement reflected “the instinct of national self-preservation and uniqueness.”5

1

Dmitrii Obolensky. The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe. (London: Ashgate, 1982), p. 17.
Petar Mutafchiev. “Kam filosofiyata na balgarskata istoriya [Towards the Philosophy of the Bulgarian History]. In:
A. Stoynev, A.Stamatov (eds.). Filosofiyata na istoriyata v Balgariya (1878-1948) [The Philosophy of History in
Bulgaria] (Sofia: Academic Publishing “Prof. Marin Drinov”, 2002), p. 384, pp. 378-384.
3
J. Howard-Johnson.” A Short Piece of Narrative History: War and Diplomacy in the Balkans, winter 921/2 – spring
924.” In: Elizabeth Jeffreys (ed.). Byzantine Style, Religion and Civilization (Cambridge University Press, 2006),
pp.340-360.
4
Mutafchiev, op.cit., p. 382, pp. 378-384.
5
Ibid., 383.
2
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It is well known that Petar Mutafchiev was also critical of the Bulgarian religious elite
and leaders of that time. They were hermits, he wrote, who distanced themselves from, and
basically denied, worldly problems and challenges, and failed to contribute in any way to the
solution of those problems, although the people, the masses, expected it of them. In this
historian’s view, the spirit of negation started from the statesmen, and continued with the
Bogomils, the hesychasts, the holy people, and the monks engaged in spiritual labor, who nowise
helped reduce the sufferings of people: “in the deserts, he contemplated God, not the suffering
man.”6; “We were not only a nation of Bogomils, but also a nation of hermits.”7; “Finally, our
lands seemed to prove too narrow to contain all its sons who were fleeing from life and from
their duty to life, so they had to scatter themselves in foreign lands as well.”8 This is what
Mustafchiev bitterly concluded in his famous essay “Priest Bogomil and Saint Ivan Rilsky.”
According to him, this spirit of negation among religious people also added a stroke to the
demoralizing role of Byzantinism.
In contrast with this Bulgarocentric notion of the relations between empire and periphery, D.
Obolensky surmounted this opposition by placing in the focus of attention a different historical
unit: the Byzantine commonwealth. The relationships between the Empire and the countries of
Eastern Europe, specifically those in the Balkans, are presented by that author in terms of more
balanced and neutral categories such as interaction, exchange, diffusion, and acculturation.
After the liberation from Byzantium and the establishment of the Second Bulgarian State
(1186 – 1391), the Bulgarian Church likewise regained its independence from Constantinople as
a result of active political and diplomatic “shuttling” between Rome and Constantinople. Along

6

Petar Mutafchiev. “Pop Bogomil i Sveti Ivan Rilski” [Priest Bogomil and Saint Ivan Rilski]. In: Z.Petrov (ed.).
Izbrani Balgarski eseta [Selected Bulgarian Essays] (Varna: G.Bakalov, 1981), p.157, pp. 144-162.
7
Ibid., p. 159.
8
Ibid.
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with the restoration of the literary and canonical traditions of the Bulgarian Church and culture,
this period was marked by the flourishing of various heretical movements–the Bogomil
movement, the Paulician sect–and of Hesychast mysticism, etc., all of them popular responses to
the poverty and social ruins resulting from wars, and a reaction to Byzantine domination.
Bulgaria under the Turkish yoke (1391-1876). During the Ottoman domination over the
Balkans, the religious ties of the Balkan countries to an external center gradually lost their
religious-cultural characteristics and became reduced to relations of institutional, ethnic,
economic domination, and dependence. The interaction ceased to have the characteristics of
transplantation and creation of culture and civilization, and turned into a religious prototype of
the Ottoman political-administrative domination. The Bulgarian Church lost its autocephalous
status and became subordinate to the Orthodox Patriarch of Istanbul, who appointed Greek
bishops throughout the territories populated by Bulgarians. Orthodoxy gradually became a
vehicle of Greek cultural domination, which particularly influenced the educated and well-to-do
urban circles of the Bulgarian population. Although it was an important historical factor for
cultural and national preservation in Bulgaria, Orthodoxy was not connected with the founding
myth of nationality. Moreover, during the Turkish domination, religion tended to acquire an
overtone of Greek domination, becoming associated with Greek interests promoted by the
Patriarchate of Constantinople. The national identity of the rural masses was supported by the
cultural activity of the monasteries, through religious literature, comprising apocrypha,
hagiography, etc. This synthesis of ideas developed further and eventually activated the
liberation movement and the establishment of the independent Bulgarian national state.
Orthodoxy was permanently bound to the ethnic survival of the people as community, while
Islam became connected with the image of the conquering ethnos. These archetypes were
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consolidated and reproduced in the time of the formation of the Balkan nation-states in the 19th
century. The analysis of Maria Todorova distinguishes the importance of two legacies here:
Of the political legacies which have shaped Southeastern Europe as a whole (the period
of Greek antiquity, Hellenism, Roman rule, etc.), two can be singled out as crucial up
until the 19th century. One is the Byzantine millennium with its profound political,
institutional, legal, religious and general cultural impact. The other is the half
millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the peninsula its name and established the longest
period of political unity it had ever experienced. Not only did part of Southeastern
Europe acquire a new name during this period, it has been chiefly the Ottoman elements
or the ones perceived as such which have formed the current stereotype of the Balkans.
In the narrow sense of the word, then, one can argue that the Balkans are, in fact, the
Ottoman legacy. 9
The Third Bulgarian State (1876 – 1944). This period is characterized by the separation
of the Church from the State (as part of the European process of secularization after the French
revolution), legally stipulated in the Turnovo Constitution, which parallel to this, declared
Orthodox Christianity to be “the dominant religion” in Bulgaria (article 37). The link between
Orthodoxy and national identity gradually lost hold on society with the gradual stratification of
rich and poor, village and town dwellers, pro- and anti-Russian political supporters, etc. The
attempts in modern times, particularly between the First and Second World Wars, to seek new
dimensions for a unique and important national mission did not prove successful and were not
widely accepted in cultural and political circles, nor in Bulgarian mass consciousness; in other
words, they failed to revive and modernize the energy of the medieval mythological archetype.
The Orthodox Churches acquired a particular role and function in the context of the
modern nation state. After the Greek revolution of 1820, the Greek Orthodox Church became a
national church, closely linked to the needs and projects of the nation state; it was subordinated
to the state in administrative terms and obtained autocephalous status. Nikos Kokosalakis called
9

MariaTodorova. “Balkanite mezhdu klisheto i evropeiskoto badeshte” [The Balkans Between Clishé and the
European Future]. Filosofski Alternativi [Philosophical Alternatives], № 6, p.13, pp. 5-16.
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this process the “secularization” of the Church, which became subordinated and connected to the
political mechanisms of the secular state.10 All Orthodox Churches in the Balkans underwent
similar developments. The Serbian Orthodox Church became autocephalous in 1879. After
World War I, when Serbia became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox
Church placed under its ecclesiastical authority the Orthodox population of Montenegro as well.
Of all these countries, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church achieved its autocephalous status with the
greatest difficulty, and latest in history. This came about in 1945, when Bulgaria was already part
of the Socialist camp. The Romanian Orthodox Church achieved independence in 1885. After
World War I, it became more stable due to the incorporation of Transylvania, with its Orthodox
population, in the Romanian kingdom; it thus became the second largest Orthodox Church after
the Russian one.
When in the 19th century the independence of the Slavic churches and states were
restored, both the Orthodox and the Slav idea were already tied with national state and political
doctrines, and had even started proving their ideological and diplomatic inapplicability under the
conditions of division and nationalization of the Orthodox community. New forms of a national
and state ideology were imposed under the new conditions after the French revolution. The
generic concept of citizen, in which ethnic and religious differences coexist and are mutually
complementary, the supremacy of the civic and political rights and the co-existence of the
individuals over their religious differences, was achieved already in the philosophy of the
Enlightenment and in the practice of the French revolution. Liberal democracies attributed to that
universal ideological program a state-political, legal, and economic form. It is quite a different

10

Nikos Kokosalakis. “Church and State in the Orthodox Context with Special Reference to Greece.” In: D.Nesti,
P.Antes, P. de Marco (eds.). European Identity and Religious Diversities in the Contemporary Changes. ( Firenze:
Angelo Pontecorboli Editore, 1995), 241-242, pp. 233-257.
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matter that some of these countries betray traditional political-diplomatic and ideological
tendencies to view the Balkan countries as a whole, as geopolitical landmark or front line.
Orthodoxy under “Socialism” (1944-1989). The main form of popular religion in the presocialist agrarian Bulgaria was rural Christian religiosity, with its strong admixture of pagan
beliefs. Industrialization, urbanization, the nationalization of peasant property under the
“socialist” regime abolished the social conditions that had supported this form of religiosity. The
Orthodox Church was subordinated to the state and the hold of religion on mass consciousness
decreased; moreover, religion was specifically targeted by atheistic ideology and the political
practice of the Communist party. The democratic processes begun in 1989 took place in a society
that had small “islands” of religiosity concentrated mainly among the older generation of rural
dwellers. The young generation as a whole was brought up in the spirit of rationalism and
pragmatism permeating a science-oriented educational system. Unlike countries like Poland and
Hungary, where religion and the Catholic Church had inspired spiritual ferment for the reformist
political tendencies, in Bulgaria, religion only reacted to such tendencies.
The fight in support of atheism assumed at least two basic forms: 1) removing the Church
institution from the public stage and weakening its influence upon religious people, and 2) the
formation of atheistic, anti-religious attitudes among those people.
The importance that the Communist Party attached to this fight stemmed from its
ideological self-identification as a carrier and supporter of enlightenment values, including the
spirit of rationality, progress, science, and modernization in all social spheres. But the “material”
the Party had at its disposal, with which to achieve this “enlightened kingdom,” was rather far
removed from these values. Hence, the task was set to form, educate, “atheize” this human
material in the course of several decades.
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Two opposite trends characterized the situation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and
religion during the “Socialist” period: 1) its status in the community of Orthodox churches grew
stronger after 1945, with the lifting of the schism upon the Church (declared by the Istanbul
Council in 1872), accompanied with active participation in international ecclesiastic forums, but
2) it was socially and culturally marginalized within Bulgarian society, and its influence strongly
decreased over mass consciousness, over ideology and politics of the country.
The process of secularization, begun after the Liberation of Bulgaria in 1878, now took a
specific, intensive turn, supported by the coercive force of the state. Church property was
nationalized, its monopoly of civil rituals (marriage, funeral, baptism) and its influence on the
educational system were interrupted for decades.11 The new Constitution (article 53), adopted in
1947 under the government of Georgi Dimitrov, and the Law on Religion, passed in 1949,
proclaimed the right of religious freedom and equality of religions. Orthodoxy was declared the
“traditional religion” of the Bulgarian people.
Scholars distinguish two periods in the Communist government’s line on Church matters
until the 1960s: the periods of 1944-1947 and 1947-1960,12 characterized by ambivalence and
inconsistency, as well as by the copying of the Soviet practice. The Party waged an
uncompromising ideological struggle against religion, which was treated as an enemy of the
regime. The momentum of revolution and fighting the enemy was stronger until 1947. According
to historians of religion, the Party made a show of revolutionary zeal in these years; lumpen
elements in society were active, and extremist measures were taken against religion and the

11

Daniela Kalkandzhieva. Balgarskata pravoslavna tsarkva i “narodnata demokratsiya” (1944 – 1953) [The
Bulgarian Orthodox Church and “People’s Democracy”] (Silistra: Demos, 2002), pp. 76-120.
12
Vladimir Mygev. “Balgarskata pravoslavna tsarkva v politikata na upravlyavashtite v Balgariya (1944-1960)”
[The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Government Policy in Bulgaria (1944-1960)]. In: Religiya i tsarkva v
Balgariya [Religion and Church in Bulgaria]( Sofia: Gutenberg, 1999), p. 273, pp. 271-280.
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Church.13 The periods 1944-1945 and 1948-1949 also witnessed the strongest waves of
repression against the clergy.14
Regarding the period 1951-1952, the Party documents of the time indicate a softening of
anti-religious extremes (the Plenum of the CC of BCP on April 23, 1951 and Decree 112 of the
Council of Ministers from March 19, 1952 required the Committee for Issues of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church to take measures against possible illegal acts aimed against religious
organizations). In the period 1948-1953, the Soviet experience was closely studied by the
Bulgarian authorities: for this purpose, on several occasions, delegations were sent to Moscow
by the Bulgarian Committee for Religious Confessions. Overall, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
proved tolerant and inclined to the idea of collaborating with the government. In the spring of
1947, Exarch Stephan entreated all clergymen to support the government campaigns and the
Two-Year Economic Plan. The Church also supported the policy of the Fatherland Front, the
country’s foreign policy, and the Bulgarian-Soviet friendship.15
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the policy of the ruling Party towards the Church and
religion continued to grow milder: the state subsidy was increased, the international connections
of the Church were stabilized, and tax concessions on Church property were introduced in 1954.
The policies in question did not yield the expected results during the first decade of the socialist
regime, and in a number of Party documents, dissatisfaction was expressed at the fact that
religious prejudices had not been dispelled yet, especially as concerned religious rituals.
Requirements were set that anti-religious propaganda should be intensified, and this attitude was

13

Ibid., p.275.
Kalkandzhieva, op.cit., p.231.
15
Mygev, p. 275; Kalkandzhieva, pp. 37-73.
14
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particularly strong after the events in Hungary and Poland in the autumn of 1956; thus,
Communist party control was tightened over religious publications.
In the Khrushchev era, in tune with the growing aggression of the Soviet Communist
Party against religion and the Church, similar trends occurred in our country, as historians have
shown: on December 26, 1957, Politburo made a special decision “On Intensifying and
Improving Atheist Propaganda in the Country,” which copied a recent decision of the CPSUВ on
the same subject. There began a brief period of renewed repression and atheist propaganda,
which soon abated, as it became clear that this was an artificially provoked propaganda
campaign16.
The new Statutes of the Bulgarian Communist Party, adopted at the 7th Party Congress in
June 1958, required from every Party member the task “of fighting resolutely against religious
prejudices,” a requirement that had been missing in the previous three versions of the Party
statutes.17
People, especially Party members, came to fear that professing one’s faith might lead to
fall in social status. This feeling remained strong even in the 1970s and 1980s, as evident from
sociological surveys in several large Bulgarian urban regions, Smolyan, Pazardzhik and Stara
Zagora; the survey findings show that between 36 percent and 51 percent of religious people
were ashamed of their religiousness and tried to hide it.18 One reason for this was that the various
forms of atheistic propaganda and agitation treated it as a remnant of the past, a mark of
backwardness and lack of education.

16

Mygev, 279.
Ibid.
18
Krastjo Krastev. Religiya, mirogled, tsennosti [Religion, Worldview, Values]. (Sofia: Partizdat, 1978), p.181.
17
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Undoubtedly, the Party-State and “scientific” atheism have played an important role in
mass secularization, but the importance of this role should not be exaggerated. The accelerated
process of industrialization, mass migration to cities, and the concentration of large working
masses were a powerful “ontological” basis of atheism imposed from above. The age-old
traditions, mode of life, the patriarchal communities, all these elements, which had been the main
milieu for reproduction of popular religiousness, were destroyed. The urbanized and
industrialized society needed and created a “new” man–rationalistic, pragmatic, atheistic.
In fact, a number of other authors believe that the rationalistic and atheistic attitudes
typical for societies in Western Europe after the age of Enlightenment were precisely a result of
the rise of science and industry,19 and the conclusion many of these scholars draw is that the
Western world has long ceased to be “Christian.”20 Of course, the difference in “Communist”
countries is that these rationalistic, atheistic “Marxist” attitudes are formed there, among other
mechanisms, through coercion exercised by the state and Party, even though Marx’s notion of
Communism and atheism as a new worldview completely differed from such a policy.21 Marx
believed that atheism would be unnecessary, for in the future Communist society, as he
understood it, religion would be exhausted as a result of the perfect social-economic order.22
But behind these general trends, authors find different concrete practices at work in each
of the “Communist” countries. For example, the conclusion of the French scholar P. Michel
(regarding Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) is that the religious sphere in these countries
began to autonomously produce a social and political area that served as an opposite pole to that

19

Patrick Masterson. Atheism and Alienation. A Study of the Philosophical Sources of Contemporary Atheism.
(Dublin/London: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), pp.7, 80; Folscheid, Dominique. L’esprit de l’athéisme et son destin.
(Paris: Editions Universitaire, 1991), pp. 7, 13, 303.
20
Erich Fromm. Byagstvo ot svobodata [Escape from Freedom]. (Sofia: Zaharii Stoyanov, 2005).
21
Masterson, pp. 88,90,91.
22
Denis Janz. World Christianity and Marxism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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of the State; religion reconstructed the social fabric, and became an authority that redefined the
political;23 however, this does not apply to the same degree to the USSR and Bulgaria.
Likewise, there is a wide consensus among scholars of religion that the domination of the
state over the religious sphere, the “ontological primacy” of the state over religion and the
Church was characteristic for Western Europe and the US during the entire 20th century
regardless of the form of government–democracy, totalitarianism, welfare state, etc.24 Arnold
Toynbee considered that in the 20th century the same processes of modernization of society and
religion had taken place both in the West and in the East, but were carried out in different
political and ideological forms.
Democratic changes (1989 -present). The transition from totalitarian to pluralistic system
of economy, politics, ideology which followed the "velvet" revolution at the end of 1989 created
the possibilities and the needs to explore the cultural space of different political and
philosophical doctrines, religious culture and other cultural products which were suppressed
under the dominance of Marxist ideology. While providing the freedom to worship in church, to
observe religious rituals, etc., the democratic process, with its economic changes, also brought
about unemployment, growing stress, uncertainty, and instability for many people.
Since 2002, there is an operative Religious Denominations Act in the Republic of
Bulgaria,25 which takes into account the basic European standards and international legal tools,
but which has periodically been criticized on separate points by some parties and human rights

23

Patrick Michel. » Légitimation et régulation étatique de la religion dans les systèmes de type soviétique:
L’exemple du catholicisme en Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie et Hongrie.” Social Compass, 37(1), 1990, p.118, pp.117125.
24
Jacque Zylberberg. “La régulation étatique de la religion: monisme et pluralisme.” Social Compass, 37(1), 1990, p.
93, pp.87-96.
25
Religious Denominations Act. Translated from Bulgarian by K.Miller. In: W.C. Durham, Jr. and S. Ferrari (eds.).
Laws on Religion and the State in Post-Communist Europe. (Leuven: PEETERS, 2004), pp. 77-92 (Original
Bulgarian version published in State Gazette Issue № 120 of December 29, 2002).
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organizations and by the structures of the European Commission, which implies that this law
should evolve and be perfected in the future.26
The new democratic constitution, adopted on July 13, 1991, recognized the equality
under law of all citizens, without “any constraints on the rights and privileges, based on race,
nationality, ethnos, sex, origin, religion, education, personal or social status, or property status,
convictions, political affiliations (art. 6, paragraph 2)." The new Religious Denominations Act
passed by the Parliament on December 20, 2002, provided a legal framework for this article of
the Constitution. The democratic evolution to the new Act was slow and difficult as in other
post-communist countries.27
The Act asserts the right of every person to freedom of conscience and faith, as well as
equality under the law, regardless of religious affiliation and convictions and supports mutual
understanding, tolerance and respect on issues regarding the freedom of conscience and faith
(Preamble). The articles 4 and 6 state that confessions are free and equal under the law, separate
from the state; discrimination based on faith is inadmissible, as also the intervention of the state
in the internal organization of religious communities and institutions. Art. 6 enumerates the
particular rights encompassed in the right of religious freedom: creating and maintaining
religious communities and institutions; establishing and maintaining places of worship or
religious assembly; creating and maintaining appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
writing, publishing and dissemination of religious publications; giving and receiving religious
instruction in a language freely chosen by the person; creating and maintaining appropriate

26

Nonka Bogomilova. Religion, Law and Politics in the Balkans in the End of 20 th and the Beginning of 21st
Century. (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2005), pp. 216-225.
27
Peter Petkov. ”The Law on Religion in Bulgaria in the Light of European Integration.” In: J.Sutton, Wil van den
Bercken (eds.). Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe ( Leuven, Paris, Dudley: PEETERS, 2003), 486489, pp. 485-501.
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institutions for teaching (in the judgment of the communities and institutions) in abiding by legal
requirements; and parents and legal guardians have the right to provide religious education for
their children according to the parents’ personal convictions.
Compared with the Law on Religious Confessions of 1949, the new Act emphasizes
much more strongly the religious rights and liberties of citizens and the equality under law of the
separate confessions. According to the Act, there are no classifications and division, no
advantages or restrictions on the basis of the legal status of the religious denominations. Another
positive feature, in conformity with European standards, is the fact that in the Act, acquiring
legal status by a religious community is not indicated as an obligatory condition for carrying out
religious activity. Many unregistered religious communities perform activities in Bulgaria now:
Orthodox, Protestant, Islamic, Buddhist, of religious syncretism of ecological and spiritual
movements. Some of them are registered under the law for non-profit legal bodies. But the
religious communities that have acquired such status, referred to in the Act as “religious
institutions,” enjoy a wider range of freedoms: “to own property” (art.21), “to produce and sell
goods” (art.22), “to own and maintain cemeteries” (art.24), to take profit from the “distribution
of the state subsidy” (art 28), “may establish medical, social and educational institutions” (art.
30), etc.
To conclude: “Bulgaria has made significant progress protecting and promoting religious
freedom with the implementation of the 1991 Constitution. Although the Constitution recognizes
its traditional link to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the government has improved its
relationship with other religious groups by improving the registration process.” 28

28

Religious Freedom in Bulgaria 2009. http://www.religionandpolicy.org (Assessed on May 20, 2012)
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According to data from the statistical census,29 the confessional belonging of the
Bulgarian citizens (total number 5 758 301) is as follows: Eastern Orthodox–4 374 135;
Muslims–577 139; Catholics–48 945; Protestants–64 476; other religions–9023; no religion– 272
264; not indicated– 409 898, etc.
The results are quite different in the analysis of religiousness.
The sociological survey carried out four years after the beginning of the changes
registered that religion and the Church were important for about 36 percent of the respondents.
Women and elderly persons attached greater importance to religion than males and persons in the
active age groups. The latter groups search for active, pragmatic solutions to the uncertainty and
instability attending social challenges. The majority of the respondents, irrespective of sex, age,
and education, does not indicate religion as being an important condition for prosperity in life.30
Research on the “Ethnic-cultural situation in Bulgaria” (unpublished), carried out by a team of
sociologists, ethnographers, demographers, etc., in 1992, gives a more detailed picture of
religiosity in the changing Bulgaria. The data show that hardly 10 percent of the Christians in
Bulgaria identify themselves as “deeply religious,” every fourth person does not attend church
services, and 21 percent of the deeply religious persons do not pray. The sociological surveys
carried out eight years after the beginning of the changes showed that 15.5% of the respondents
believed definitely in God or Allah, 47 percent believed “to some degree,” 10 percent believed
but not in God, 8.9 percent identified as atheists, and 18.7 percent were not interested in
religion.31 In general, these findings reflect a process of fermentation, individuation, and of a
more open and non-traditional attitude to the Orthodox rituals, dogmas, and beliefs. As in
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Western Europe, only a small percentage of people practice the kind of religiosity that includes
doctrinal knowledge, strict observation of Christian moral rules and ritual practices as a lifestyle.
Bulgaria is known for its good and peaceful ethnic-religious model, established here
during the democratic changes. Those conclusions were confirmed by the surveys, realized in
1999-2000,32 in 2001,33 and in 200934: the ethnic situation in Bulgaria is relatively calm; the
ethnic and religious differences do not occupy the top ranks as possible causes for conflict
between the corresponding groups–only 34 percent of the respondents indicate such reasons; and
at the same time, the majority of Bulgarians do not favor rights that institutionalize ethnic
interests (and especially those of the Roma) at the cultural and national level. “A more alarming
fact has been perhaps the accumulation of prejudice with regard to the Gypsies.”35 In the
sociological studies dating from the beginning of the new century, it was clearly established that
these stereotypes have been preserved and enhanced in Bulgarian society.
The difficulties of the economic transformations in Bulgaria are adding energy to anti“sect” feelings too. The intensive start of some new religions in Bulgaria was stimulated both by
the situation of anomie and desacralization of the past and by the lack of doctrines and ideas
sacralizing the present. The Bulgarians lost the supporting reference points both of their social
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and personal biographies. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which has been for many years
capsulated and alienated from actual social problems, could not offer new spiritual roots. This
situation of anomie after the “velvet” revolution was favorable for some New Religious
Movements. Their ideas about resacralization of present, about the imminence of God’s
Kingdom, about God’s elect, attracted schoolboys, students, workers, and intellectuals.
Another fact which in Bulgaria lends additional energy to "anti-sect" emotions is related
to the foreign leadership of most new, non-traditional religions. The foreign missionaries are
usually viewed as an anti-national, anti-patriotic phenomenon. In a similar way, B. Stojković
characterizes the attitude of the Serbian society towards the “sects” as “stigmatization” and
“moral panic.”36 This perception is a sign of hidden nationalistic feelings; such feelings are
reflected to some degree in the new Law on Religion, which limits and complicates the legal
activities of New Religious Movements (art.7 and 8). As a result of the critics of the Law, the
European Commission monitoring on the religious freedom and rights was reestablished in
Bulgaria in June 2003. As a matter of fact, “it is not uncommon for media outlets to disseminate
negative and derogatory stories about non traditional religious groups.”37
Although in constitutional and legal terms the freedom of religious belief and religious
communities has been declared in post-communist countries, in fact in most of them, the
religions of the minorities and the New Religious Movements are in a disadvantaged position. A
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more complicated procedure for registration and performing activities has been established for
them than for the traditional confessions.38
From 1992 to 2002, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was in a state of painful and lasting
schism. This division and opposition was a reflection of and influenced by the political
opposition between the two main Bulgarian political parties in the beginning of the democratic
changes, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (former Communists) and the Union of Democratic
Forces. The Bulgarian Patriarch Maxim was elected head of the Holy Synod in the socialist
period and continued to hold this position. The alternative synod claimed it was innocent of the
ecclesiastic errors of the communist past, especially of connections with the Communist Party.
In coming to power after the democratic changes of the early 1990s, the party Union of
Democratic Forces proclaimed that the Holy Synod of the BOC had been a collaborator of the
communist regime. Three of the bishops belonging to the circle of associates of the Patriarch
Maxim founded a new, “authentic” synod, which received legal status under the administration
of the UDF. After the UDF fell from power in 1993 and the former communist party, the BSP,
came to power in its turn, state support was transferred to the Synod headed by the Patriarch
Maxim.
The Church schism, lasted more than 10 years, has largely reduced the authority of and
public confidence in the Church. The institutional schism has divided the bishops of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church into two hostile alternative synods, both claiming legitimacy, and
vying for Church property, holding alternative celebrations of religious holidays, etc.
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Analysts believe the schism had political, economic and religious causes.39 The political
causes involved the political interests of the parties coming to power in turn and successively
supporting either side of the divided Church. The economic interests involved ownership of the
property of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Neither the efforts inside the Church nor the
pressure of public opinion produced a definitive solution to church division. The new Law on
Religion, critically accepted by the UDF and the non-Orthodox religions, attempts to solve the
problem by giving support to the Synod headed by Patriarch Maxim. The process of
politicization and schism alienated the Church from the need and problems of the believers.
Sociological surveys registered low rates of confidence in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church one
year after the schism: about 20 percent of the interviewed persons indicated complete trust in the
Church; 26 percent trust to some extent; 17 percent were rather mistrustful; and 36 percent did
not trust it at all.40
The ultimate result of the schism, to which the ruling party NMSS coercively put an end,
first through the Religious Denominations Act in 2002 and then by the intervention of court and
police in 2004, was the loss of authority and trust in the BOC. The fragile relation of the Eastern
Orthodoxy to the national identity was eliminated.

Conclusion

In Bulgaria, the line of cleavage in society since the start of democratic changes was not
ethnic-based but political, hence religious differences (especially between Orthodoxy and Islam)
39
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but never became a basis for mutual aggression and contention. The prevalence of political strife
over religious-ethnic differences was evident in the political divisions within the Orthodox
community itself: the formation and opposition between the two synods of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church reflected and resulted from the political-party division within society at large.
The newest history of Bulgaria confirms the domination of the state over the religious
sphere, the “ontological primacy” of the state over religion and the Church as a main feature of
State-Church relations in Bulgaria. The Byzantine “legacy” of State-Church symphony bears
both repetition and transformation.
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